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JOB SECURITY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
NORMAN B. SMITH AND PATRICIA GEBALA*
What protections do public employees in the United States have
against arbitrary, summary discharge? It is, of course, clear that no
public employee may be discharged for inherently suspect reasons
such as motivations based on race. Further, constitutional protec-
tions are provided by way of procedural due process for those who
have attained certain liberty and property rights in their jobs. Fi-
nally, public employees are protected contractually to the extent pro-
vided explicitly by collective bargaining agreements or by federal,
state, and municipal civil service laws.
Despite the apparent job security afforded by the preceding safe-
guards which in some cases overlap, it will be seen that job security
for public employees as a whole is often illusory because either they
may not work for a governmental unit which provides or allows these
safeguards or the safeguards themselves may have been minimized
by interpretation and usage. Indeed, as late as 1950 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit could still say,
"The First Amendment guarantees free speech and assembly, but it
does not guarantee Government employ,"' echoing the words of Jus-
tice Holmes that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
'2
Nevertheless, it is herein submitted that while one may not have a
right to employment by the government, once having been employed
and having proven his ability to perform his job, he should in most
cases have the right to retain his job free from the fear of arbitrary
or summary removal. Such minimal security would seem to be imper-
ative as public employment continues to usurp a greater and greater
percentage of the total job market.'
*Mr. Smith earned his B.A. degree from the University of North Carolina in 1960
and his LL.B. degree from Harvard University in 1965. He is a member of the North
Carolina bar and of the firm of Smith, Carrington, Patterson, Follin & Curtis of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Mrs. Gebala is a member of the Colorado bar. She earned
her B.A. degree from the University of Colorado in 1967 and her J.D. degree from the
University of Colorado in 1970.
'Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 118 (1951).
'McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
3During the past 30 years the ranks of government employees have more than
tripled, while the nation's total labor force has not increased by as much as 50%:
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Collective Bargaining Agreements
Members of public employees' unions which are parties to collec-
tive bargaining agreements are protected against arbitrary and sum-
mary discharge by the contractual arbitration procedure and grounds
for dismissal. The typical labor contract permits discharge only on
the basis of an enumerated act of misconduct and authorizes dis-
charge only after the several steps of the grievance procedure have
been exhausted.' These basic job protections, incidentally, would
seem to comport with procedural due process requirements in the
context of employment termination. 5 The number of public employ-
ees who are members of labor unions has increased dramatically in
Number Government Employees
Year Federal State Local Total Labor Force
1940 1,128,000 3,346,000 56,180,000
1950 2,117,000 1,057,000 3,228,000 63,858,000
1960 2,421,000 1,527,000 4,860,000 72,142,000
1970 2,881,000 2,755,000 7,392,000 85,903,000
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 109, 345 (1973).
'E.g., Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972). For the purpose of this
discussion it is assumed that all labor contracts with government employees contain
these provisions (see generally PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS [Zagoria ed.
1972]); it is recognized that there may be exceptional agreements which do not.
5Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the latest authority on procedural
due process rights of government employees, makes it clear that no rigid delineation
of due process requirements can be made for these cases in general: "[A] weighing
process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in
particular situations by procedural due process." Id. at 570. The Court went on to
quote Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970):" 'The formality and procedural
requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests
involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.' "The full range of procedural
due process rights in an administrative hearing, as outlined in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), include notice of the reasons supporting the proposed action, an
opportunity to be heard, the right to cross examine, the right to present evidence, and
the right to be represented by counsel. There is one case in which a public employee
challenged the constitutional adequacy of a greivance proceeding under a collective
bargaining contract, Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972), but the court
in that case did not reach this issue. Viewing the flexible approach toward due process
requirements taken by Board of Regents v. Roth together with the courts' usual reluct-
ance to interfere with grievance arbitration under labor contracts, e.g., United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), it is reasonable to expect
that, absent gross irregularities, a public employee's discharge after losing a grievance
proceeding would be upheld by the courts.
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recent years.' Thus, by 1970, 18% of all federal, state, and local em-
ployees were union members. While it is conceded that some of these
employees are not covered by collective bargaining contracts, it is
reasonable to suppose that most of them are and that these contracts
provide at least some measure of job security.
Civil Service Laws
Since the early 1960's most of the states have enacted civil service
laws or merit system laws which provide job protection to state em-
ployees, and in a number of states there are civil service systems that
protect local government employees as well.7 The initial impetus for
many of these laws seemed to come from the federal statutory re-
quirements that state employees in federal grant-in-aid programs be
covered by merit system rules.8 Of course, the great majority of em-
ployees of the United States Government have been subject to civil
service protection since 1912.1
More specifically, the public servants of thirty-nine states gener-
ally are covered by civil service laws that enumerate the causes for
discharge and require notice and an administrative hearing preceding
discharge. In five other states these protections are accorded only to
limited segments of the public work force."0 By contrast, the extent
to which employees of local government bodies are covered by civil
service laws is a difficult matter to ascertain from a review of the state
statutes. One source states that all cities in the United States with a
population over 250,000 have civil service systems." In three states





U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATIsTIcS 339-42 (1973).
7Aronson, Personnel Administration, The State and Local Picture, 13 CIvIL
SERVICE L.J. 37 (1972).
'E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(5) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-.226 (1971).
"See the table set out in the Appendix to this article. Those states which have
comprehensive coverage of public employees generally exclude only such persons as
elected officers, judges, officers required by the constitution to be appointed by the
governor, members of boards and commissions, state militia, students, inmates of state
institutions, laborers, and hourly employees. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-110 et
seq. (1950). Why laborers and hourly employees should not be deserving of job security
is not apparent, but these are common exclusions.
"Aronson, supra note 7. From another source it is learned that 83 out of 201
counties responding to a nationwide study have civil service programs. MuNicn'AL YEAR
BOOK 180-86 (1970).
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(New York, Alaska, and Louisiana) local civil service systems are
required in all cities; in sixteen states local civil service systems are
required in cities of certain sizes or with certain groups of local gov-
ernment employees; in twenty-two states a prescribed form of civil
service system is available to local governmental units for their adop-
tion by referendum or ordinance; 2 and a number of other states grant
their municipalities general powers to adopt merit systems without
specification of the details. 3
It is reasonable to estimate that 75% of all state employees in the
United States are protected by civil service laws from arbitrary or
summary discharge. 4 An accurate estimate of the number of local
government employees thus protected cannot be made. It must be
recognized that many public employees are both members of unions
and subject to civil service or merit systems, so that the numerical
range of protection afforded by these sources of employee rights is
diminished by the overlap.
Under almost all civil service laws, an employee acquires the right
not to be discharged, except upon specified grounds and after notice
and hearing, once he has become a permanent employee. The proce-
dural protection given by these laws ordinarily should be found by the
courts to be consistent with due process.' The period of probationary
"See the table set out in the Appendix to this article.
13E.g., GA. CODE ANN. tit. 69, § 310 (1957).
"This percentage is derived from the table in the Appendix together with the
figures in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 114-15 (1973).
"5See the discussion in note 5 supra. There is, however, a division in the lower
courts regarding the constitutionality of discharge procedures under the federal civil
service act and regulations. Kennedy v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(unconstitutional); Henley v. Schultz, 13 CIVIL SERV. L.J. 10 (N.D. Pa. 1972) (constitu-
tional). The United States Supreme Court recently dealt with this issue in Arnett v.
Kennedy, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974). Five separate opinions were filed, so
it cannot be said that the Court has reached a meaningful consensus. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the judgment of the Court, said that the procedures established
by and under the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, for the removal of nonproba-
tionary employees from the competitive civil service, are constitutional. He reasoned
that the property interests protected by the due process clause are created and defined
by sources such as statutes which are independent of the Constitution. In the Lloyd-
La Follette Act, Congress created the property interest in continued employment and
established the procedure by which individuals could be deprived of this interest. The
statute cannot be bifurcated at will: "A litigant in the position of appellee must take
the bitter with the sweet." - U.S. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 1644. As is pointed out by
the dissenting justices and by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, this sort
of reasoning too severely limits the protection of the due process clause. It would
appear from the plurality opinion that if the statute granting the interest contains any
provision for a procedure to be followed in the discharge of an employee, however
sketchy or inadequate, the employee if he is to assert his property interest must content
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or temporary employment before job security is acquired varies from
six months to as long as six years, but the typical transitional point
is at six months. 6
Discharges for Unconstitutional Reasons
When the distinction in constitutional law between rights and
privileges fell into disfavor,' 7 the broad holding of Bailey v.
Richardson8 was doomed. In Graham v. Richardson,'" Justice Black-
mun wrote for the Court, "[Tlhis court now has rejected the concept
that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit
is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Thus, although a
person still may have no right to be hired by the government and may
be dismissed from government employment for any. number of rea-
sons, there are some reasons upon which the government is powerless
to act.29 For example, it has been repeatedly held that a public em-
ployee may not be fired on account of race,2' for exercising his right
of free speech, 2 for exercising his right to religious freedom,23 for
engaging in his right of association,2 for claiming his privilege against
self incrimination,2 or in violation of his right of personal privacy.
20
himself with the inadequate statutory procedure. This approach seriously erodes the
Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which allowed welfare
recipients to assert their property interest in the receipt of their benefits and at the
same time challenge the constitutionality of the procedures through which the benefits
could be terminated.
"E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 90.110(2) (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.250 (1969).
"2Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
"RSee quotation in text accompanying note 1 supra.
"403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
aPerry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
2'Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
22Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Supreme Court has re-
cently determined that a public employee can be dismissed for publicly criticizing his
agency, Arnett v. Kennedy, - U.S. _ 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974), on the theory that
such utterances tend to impair his own effectiveness as an employee and that of his
agency. This decision is most difficult to square with Pickering, where the employee
was protected after making comments critical of his superiors.
2Hollon v. Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1967).
2'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952). These authorities provide an additional source of job security for the
public employee who is a union member. Discharge may not lawfully be predicated
upon his union membership or activity protected by the right of association. Contine
v. Van Cleve, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973).
=Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 274 (1968); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
2'Lindquist v. City of Coral Gables, 323 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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Of course, these constitutional prohibitions may not protect the job
of a high ranking appointee in a policy-making position. Such indi-
viduals may properly be dismissed on account of their activities
which ordinarily would be protected speech and association; and this
exception appears necessary to insure teamwork at the apex of the
administration.Y
What of the case where both a constitutionally protected ground
and an unprotected ground motivate a public employer to dismiss an
employee? The circuit courts of appeal are divided on the appropriate
solution. The Fifth Circuit held that the dismissal is valid if the
unconstitutional ground played a minor role; and even if it played a
significant role, the balance of interests weighs in favor of the em-
ployer.3 The Seventh Circuit held the dismissal is valid as long as
an unprotected ground exists. 29 The Eighth Circuit held that if any
protected ground exists, the dismissal is invalid."
With respect to the public employee's remedy for discharge for
unconstitutional reasons, the Supreme Court recently made it clear
that such a claim does not necessitate a pre-discharge administrative
hearing.3' The employee's remedy is to bring a civil action against the
employer under the Civil Rights Act of 187532 or the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.11
The Spoils System Problem
Once it is established that the First Amendment freedom of asso-
ciation protects a public employee from discharge on account of his
associational activity, 4 it would seem that discharges of employees
under a patronage system solely because they were members of the
2'Gold v. Walker, 356 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See the further discussion of
this issue in text at note 43 infra.21Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
"McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
"Smith v. Board of Educ. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972). The Court distingushed
cases requiring prior adversary hearings where First Amendment rights were at issue,
such as Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), by saying that they involved
conduct which directly infringed upon First Amendment rights; and as to the case
before it the Court said, "Whatever may be a teacher's rights of free speech, the
interest in holding a teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free
speech interest." Id.
-42 U.S.C. § 1983.
=42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, applicable only to discharges based on race, religion, color,
sex, and national origin.
3'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
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wrong political party could not be sustained. Yet the spoils system
continues to flourish in most of those jurisdictions where civil service
laws have not been enacted. 5 Is its continued operation consistent
with the Constitution?
In United States v. Robel,36 the Supreme Court relying on the
ground of freedom of association protected a Communist's right to
maintain his employment. It certainly seems that Democrats and
Republicans should be entitled to the same protection. On at least
two occasions the Court has said by way of dicta that public employ-
ees cannot lawfully be discharged for membership in one of the prin-
cipal political parties. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union,
Local 473 v. McElroy, the Court remarked that "she could not have
been left out of a government job because she was a Democrat or a
Methodist."3
The Court in United Public Workers v. Mitchell stated:
Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the
Bill of Rights and that Congress may not "enact a regulation
providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed
to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass
or take any active part in missionary work." None would deny
such limitations on Congressional power. .... .1
However, notwithstanding the clear application of the First Amend-
ment right of association, the cases are sharply divided as to whether
discharges to make room for patronage appointees are constitution-
ally permissible. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the spoils
system; 39 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
struck it down;4 ° and the Supreme Court declined opportunities to
review these cases.
4 '
=See generally M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE VicrOR (1971); BUSINESS WEEK,
May 22, 1971, at 22 (4000 employees fired in Illinois, 3500 employees fired in Pennsyl-
vania, in recent changes of administration).
36389 U.S. 258 (1967).
37Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961).
"United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1949).
"American Federation of State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 529, 280 A.2d 375
(1971); Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971). To the same effect is Indiana
State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 357 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Ind. 1973), but this case is
not useful as a precedent because it is in clear conflict with Illinois State Employees
Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), hereinafter mentioned.
"Illinois State Employees Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972).
"Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972);
Illinois State Employees Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 493 (1973).
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The cases upholding the spoils system have found interests of the
government and the public which transcend the interests of the
employee in exercising his freedom of association, voting in the party
primary of his choice, and earning a livelihood without sacrificing
these rights. First, the governmental interest of obtaining loyal and
obedient public service is claimed:
[G]ood administration requires that the personnel in charge
of implementing the policies of an agency be responsible to and
responsive to those charged with the policy-making function,
who in turn are responsible to a higher governmental author-
ity, or to the public itself, whichever selected them. This chain
of responsibility is the basic check on government by the pub-
lic at large. The power to dismiss summarily is the assurance
of such responsibility. 2
This argument is valid when applied to high level appointees who
have policy-making responsibilities. Undoubtedly this is the consid-
eration that prompted the exemption of such persons from most civil
service laws 3 and even from federal legislation forbidding race, sex,
and religious discrimination in public employment.44 It is generally
accepted that politically elected officers should have unfettered
choice in filling policy-making positions. But this argument does not
fit the rank and file worker whose task it is to carry out the policies
formulated by those at the highest echelons. If the ordinary govern-
ment employee defies the orders of his superiors in deference to his
own political philosophy, he is clearly guilty of misconduct which can
be remedied by discharge. 5 Common sense tells us that the non-
policy making employee will not be inclined toward disloyalty and
disobedience for political reasons, but will continue to perform his job
in the same manner as he did before the change of administrations.
Extensive experience under the civil service laws, as well as informed
opinion,4" are supportive of this common sense view. It was in part
because the spoils system was so inefficient that civil service laws
2American Federation of State Employees v. Shapp, 280 A.2d at 378. See
generally Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System-The Judiciary Visits
Patronage Place, 57 IowA L. REv. 1320 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Analysis].
13Note 10 supra.
1142 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
"E.g., Studemeyer v. Macy, 321 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
934 (1963).
"Constitutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1326 n.31, 1345 nn.122-23; Richardson,
Problems of the Removal of Federal Servants, 54 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1955).
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were enacted." Moreover, it should be remembered that the dis-
missed employee is trained and experienced, while the new spoils
system employee is untrained and inexperienced since, by definition,
patronage is the provision of employment in reward for party loyalty,
not proven or even predicted competence. Thus, the effect of a pa-
tronage turnover in employment is to disrupt and degrade, rather
than improve, public administration.
The second justification offered for the spoils system of public
employment is that it has traditionally served a quasi-welfare func-
tion by providing a supplementary means of enabling poor families
to subsist." This argument overlooks the fact that for every poor
person placed on the public employment rolls after the elections,
another must be discharged and cut off from his means of support.
In any case, whatever validity this purpose may have had in bygone
days has been rendered insignificant by modern welfare legislation. 9
Third, it is argued that the spoils system is essential to the two
party system, and that if it is undermined the two-party system will
decline and ultimately democracy will fall." Many municipalities
have long operated under non-partisan forms of government. 5' The
great majority of federal government employees have been protected
by civil service laws since 1912.52 Neither of these developments has
visibly weakened the national and state two party systems or
perceptibly injured our democratic form of government. Thus, this
third argument has not been borne out by history.
Finally, it is argued that persons who are themselves beneficiaries
of the patronage system should not be heard to complain of its fore-
seeable consequences. Those who "live by the political sword should
be prepared to die by the political sword."5 Unlike the other argu-
ments, this presents a legal question and not an issue of public policy.
"Constitutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1345 n.124.
"F. Greenstein, TmE AMRICA PARTY SYSTEM AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 46-50, 54
(1970).
"Constitutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1326.
"'Schoen, Politics, Patronage and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 35, 83-97
(1969).
"Fewer than one third of the cities responding to a survey report that the ballot
used in city council general elections indicates a political party. Pressure for non-
partisan municipal elections and government began early in the twentieth century,
based on the belief that national politics and political parties have little relevance to
municipal problems and local issues. Klevit, City Councils and Their Function in
Local Government, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 15 (1972).
515 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). See also 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-.226 (1971).
"American Federation of State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375,
378 (1971).
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The question must be resolved against the spoils system, because a
waiver of such a fundamental freedom as that of association cannot
be so lightly presumed. 4
It is now well established that whenever a fundamental freedom
is to be in some way curtailed or whenever a constitutionally suspect
classification is involved, the burden is upon the government to dem-
onstrate a compelling state interest served by the action.5 The
equally well established corollary principle is that the limitation
upon individual rights will not be sustained if some less restrictive
measure could adequately serve the state interest in question. 6 The
freedom of association is recognized to be a fundamental freedom.-7
And, at least according to Justice Harlan, the criterion of political
allegiance appears to have been added to the list of constitutionally
suspect classifications. 58 Accordingly, a compelling state interest
must be identified if the spoils system is to be lawfully maintained.
The arguments in favor of patronage-obtaining loyal and obedient
employees, serving a quasi-welfare function, and upholding the two
party system--are not supported by either experience or common
sense. It is submitted that there is not even a rational basis" for the
spoils system, much less a compelling governmental interest in main-
taining it.6" Moreover, each of the interests sought to be advanced by
the spoils system can be adequately protected by means which are
less restrictive of the freedoms at stake, viz., by discharging disobe-
5Illinois State Employees Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 573-74 (7th Cir. 1972).
See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
5United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (applying the doctrine in an employ-
ment case where the restriction of free association was at issue); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
5"Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
"Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
"In and of itself, the maintenance of a two party system is not a compelling
governmental interest which would overcome the rights to associate and vote. Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
IDThe rational basis test applies if constitutional rights are at stake but the action
in question does not require a compelling governmental interest; to be valid the state
action must have a rational basis, or must not be arbitrary and capricious. Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
"1The least flimsy of the arguments supporting the spoils system, that it removes
disloyal employees, appears to have been foreclosed by the decision of Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). There it was held that mere affiliation with a subver-
sive organization was an insufficient basis for discharging public employees. So it
would seem to be unconstitutional to discharge an employee solely because he is a
member of the opposing major political party without proving acts of misconduct on
his part. See Constitutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1343.
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dient and incompetent employees, by continuing the system of public
welfare, and by maintaining the two party system through means less
susceptible of corruption and harm, e.g., by a campaign fund income
tax check-off.2
Upon consideration of the holdings in the freedom of association
cases, the dicta about political rights of employees in these cases, and
the arguments favoring the spoils system, it is believed that when a
patronage discharge case eventually is reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the employee is likely to prevail.
Judicial Review of Administrative Action
The Administrative Procecedure Act 6 3 and similar state
legislation"4 make most governmental agency action subject to judi-
cial review. In fact there is a presumption in favor of judicial reviewa-
bility; 5 and any reviewable action, upon complaint by a party ag-
grieved, will be set aside if found by the court to be arbitrary or
capricious."
Such a remedy would seem made to order for the government
worker dismissed without cause. There are, however, certain types of
administrative actions which by law are committed to agency discre-
tion and are not subject to judicial review. 7 For example, before the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Supreme Court,
"'See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 129, 162 (1970); Constitutional Analysis, supra note 42, at 1342-50.
635 U.S.C. 99 701-06 (1966).
"E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-713 (1967). A Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act was promulgated in 1961 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and an impressive number of state legislatures have adopted it in major part. GA. CODE
ANN. § 3A-101; Hawaii Sess. Laws 1961, act 103, § 14; IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3014;
MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 20-A, § 131; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30-A, § 14; MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 3.560 (21.8); MINN. STAT. § 15.0424; Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 67-26-17; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.14;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-35-15; TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-901; VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-13;
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130; Wis. STAT. § 227.15. A major difference exists between
the federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Model Act and state legislation
following it. The federal Administrative Procedure Act states that "[a] person suffer-
ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof."
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966). Section 15 of the Model Act contains the more liberal standing
requirement that any person "who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case
is entitled to judicial review."
"First applied in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94 (1902); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION 339 (1965).
-5 U.S C. § 706 (1966).
"5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1966).
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invoking judge-made law, had repeatedly held that the firing of a
public employee was a matter solely within the discretion of the
public employer. 8 However, the Supreme Court has yet to make an
authoritative determination as to whether the modem doctrine of
judicial review and the express provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act provide a remedy for a federal employee fired from his job.
The question was answered negatively by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Bailey v. Richardson,"9 but this case was affirmed by an
equally divided Supreme Court and therefore is not a precedent.
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy70 is also some-
times cited for the proposition that a dismissed employee is without
rights; 7' however, the narrow question before the Court in that case
was only whether a private employee could be denied access to a
military installation where she worked because her security clearance
had been withheld.
In recent years judicial review of administrative action has been
engaged in very expansively by the Supreme Court.72 The exceptions
to reviewability are generally limited to those situations for which
legislative intent to the contrary can be found, or in which the nature
of the action provides special reasons for non-reviewability as for
example, in the case of military operations and foreign affairs. 3 How-
ever, there are no statutes providing that federal employment dis-
charges are committed to agency discretion; and no special reasons
for nonreviewability appear. Moreover, the practicality and reasona-
bleness of hearings to review public employment termination have
been demonstrated by the procedures followed in most civil service
systems.
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that the Su-
preme Court should hold federal employment discharges to be reme-
diable under the Administrative Procedure Act instead of continuing
to rely on the old judge-made rule that government employment is
terminable at will.74 In states with administrative review laws similar
"Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290
(1900); Matter of Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
1',182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 118
(1951).
70367 U.S. 886 (1961).
"Comment, Due Process and Public Employment in Perspective, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1052, 1068-69 (1972).
72E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
1
3
K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 28.02, at 510 (3d ed. 1972).
"But see the recent case of Sampson v. Murray, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 931
(1974), in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist speaking for the Court seemed to reaffirm the
old judge-made rule of Bailey and McAuliffe. Cf. text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
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to those of the federal government, there should also be a movement
toward protection of public employees from arbitrary discharges. 5
The potential for judicial review of discharges of state public employ-
ees is very substantial. All non-civil service positions might be cov-
ered. 6 Finally, while state administrative procedure laws ordinarily
do not extend to actions of municipal and county agencies, some
states invoke a judge-made doctrine of judicial review to set aside
arbitrary decisions of governmental subdivisions;77 this doctrine pos-
sibly could be made available to review discharges of employees of
local governmental units.
Procedural Due Process
In those instances in which a public employee has an express
contract of employment, the employing agency cannot lawfully dis-
charge him unless as a result of misconduct or for some other suffi-
cient reason the employee is in breach of the contract. In this respect
the rights of public and private employees are the same; they are
grounded on the law of contract. 8
Because express contracts of employment are not common among
government workers, attention must shift to relationships in the na-
7 It is generally agreed that courts have the power to review administrative acts
to determine whether they are arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259, 123 N.W.2d 387 (1963). Al-
though the state courts have not developed precise definitions for these terms, it is
often stated that courts may not substitute their discretion for that of the agency, and
that a mere difference of opinion as to what would constitute suitable action cannot
be said to be arbitrary and capricious. State ex rel Boroo v. Town Board of Barnes, 10
Wis.2d 153, 102 N.W.2d 238 (1960); Culinary Institute of America, Inc. v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 143 Conn. 257, 121 A.2d 637 (1956); McKnight v. Board of Public
Educ., 365 Pa. 422, 76 A.2d 207 (1950). It has been argued that this approach is too
limited and that the test incorporated in § 15(g)(6) of the Revised Model State Act,
"clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion," should be adopted. This would allow for
review in those cases where the courts have indicated disapproval of an agency's
exercise of discretion but have ruled that no clear abuse existed. COOPER, STATE ADMIN-
ISTRATIvE LAW 771-72 (1965).
6A civil service employee probably would have no remedy under this approach,
because the civil service procedure may be deemed the exclusive remedy intended by
the legislature. See text at note 66 supra. Even if he did, the remedy would be inferior
to that provided under civil service laws which allow pre-discharge hearings on their
merits, whereas judicial review would be only a limited post-discharge inquiry to
determine whether there was any basis in fact for the conclusion supporting the dis-
charge. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
7E.g., Brown v. Candler, 236 N.C. 576, 73 S.E.2d 550 (1952) (abuse of discretion).
See 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 110-11 (1968).
78Cf. Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1898); Sax v. Detroit,
G.H.&M. Ry., 125 Mich. 252, 84 N.W. 314 (1900).
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ture of implied contract. Traditionally, public employment has been
regarded by the courts as employment terminable at will, with or
without cause." However, in recent years the protections of proce-
dural due process have been expanded by the courts to cover a variety
of interests, including the continuation of welfare benefits,8" tenancy
in a public housing project,8 and enrollment as a student in a state
university. 2 A number of commentators have advocated that the
continuation of public employment be regarded as one of those inter-
ests that could not be interfered with except by observing the require-
ments of procedural due process.
In 1972 the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth84 and
Perry v. Sindermann85 analyzed the rights of public employees in the
context of the liberty and property language of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court concluded there is no general right to contin-
ued public employment and that procedural due process require-
ments apply only to certain instances of discharge. But the Court did
find a property interest in continued public employment, requiring
notice and hearing before dismissal, in each of the following circum-
stances:
(a) where an office is held under tenure provisions;
(b) during the term of an existing employment contract;
(c) where there is a clearly implied promise of continued
employment;
(d) where the right to employment is grounded in statute;
(e) where the employment practices in question have
evolved into a "common law" of continued employment;
(f) in any other situation in which the employee has an
objective expectation of continued employment (more than an
abstract need, desire or unilateral expectation of continued
employment).8
79See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
'Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
"Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
'Frakt, Non-Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 KA. L. REv. 27 (1969);
Pettigrew, Constitutional Tenure: Toward a Regulation of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 475 (1971); Note, Dismissal of Federal Employees-The Emerging
Judicial Role, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 719 (1966); Comment, Due Process and Public Em-
ployment in Perspective, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1052 (1972).
"-408 U.S. 564 (1972).
-408 U.S. 593 (1972).
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 n.16; Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601-02.
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It should be noted that there are possibly other categories of em-
ployees with a property interest; the Court nowhere said its list was
exhaustive.
The Court stated that these "property" interests are not created
by the Constitution, but are defined by "rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law."8 7 The Court thus
seemed to leave federal and state courts free to fashion "constitu-
tional common law" rules to fit public employees into the various
categories entitled to protection. However, the Chief Justice in his
concurring opinion made it clear that he believes state law, not fed-
eral "constitutional common law," should govern the public em-
ployee's job security, and advised that federal courts should abstain
for state judicial determinations of the employee's entitlement to due
process whenever the question arises." And the majority opinion
came close to adopting this view in a footnote: "If it is the law of
Texas that a teacher in the respondent's position has no contractual
or other claim to job tenure, the respondent's claim would be de-
feated. '89 This inclination to defer to state law portends an unfortun-
ate retreat from the Supreme Court's traditional willingness to de-
velop judge-made rules to implement constitutional rights." The re-
sult may be a substantial limitation on the potential impact of these
two important decisions on the rights of public employees.
The enumeration of property interests in the Roth and
Sindermann cases has the effect of extending an overlay of federal
procedural due process protection to all public employees covered by
civil service laws,9' other job security laws,92 collective bargaining
agreements,93 and express contracts of employment, as well as to any
class of workers with implied rights or objective expectations of con-
tinued employment. Apparently foreseeing this broad application of
its decision, the Court wrote that a "weighing process" would be used
to determine the "form of hearing required."' 4 By these words, the
Court seemed to suggest that forms of procedures available under
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (emphasis added).
'Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603-04.
"Id. at 602 n.7.
"Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1971); Note, Board of Regents
v. Roth, 5 CONN. L. REv. 685, 699-701 (1973).
"Snead v. Department of Social Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Norlan-
der v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972).
"Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (veterans' preference stat-
ute).
"See Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1972).
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570.
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such widely variant dismissal determinations as the management-
labor grievance process and the civil service board hearing will be
respected, as long as gross procedural abuses do not occur.
5
In addition to property interests found under certain circumstan-
ces, the Supreme Court at the same time decided that there is a
liberty interest in continued public employment, requiring notice and
hearng before dismissal, where the employer makes a charge against
the employee "that might seriously damage his standing and associa-
tions in the community."96
Applying its tests for liberty and property interests to the facts of
the cases at hand, the Court ruled that neither plaintiff had estab-
lished a "liberty" right to procedural due process; that both plain-
tiffs' claims of retaliatory dismissal for exercising free speech were
appropriate for consideration in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 91
that Roth was not entitled to notice and hearing because, as a first
year college teacher whose contract had not been renewed, he had
acquired no "property" right; and that Sindermann would be entitled
to notice and hearing on remand if he could show he had implied
tenure or a reasonable expectancy of continued employment as a
consequence of teaching for ten years in the state college system
under certain rules and understandings.
98
The holdings of Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v.
Sindermann do not apply solely to school and college teachers, al-
though most of the enormous amount of public employment dis-
charge litigation in recent years has involved members of the teaching
profession.99 Teachers do not have any greater constitutional rights
than other public employees.' The Supreme Court in both cases
used the terms "public employee" and "public employment" often
enough' 0' to make it understood that the principles enunciated in
these cases were relevant to all government employee dismissal cases,
not just those of educators.
Servants of the government are given important job protection
" See the discussions at notes 5 and 15 supra.
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573.
"7See the discussion in text accompanying notes 27 and 43 supra.
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
"E.g., Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1971); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970);
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969); Freeman v. Gould Special School
Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969).
°"'Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
"'Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.6; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597.
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rights by the Roth and Sindermann cases. Yet it may properly be
asked how those in the public employment sector may be legitimately
singled out for preferential treatment. This question should not be
seen as one concerning preferential treatment of the employee but
rather as relating to the problem of curbing the governmental em-
ployer's arbitrariness. If the government is an employer, it is bound
by the constitutional limitations upon government; it is regulated as
a government, not as an employer. As stated by Justice Douglas
regarding the government's analogous status as landlord:
It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might
terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is the government
we are dealing with, and the actions of the government are
circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. "The government as landlord is still the govern-
ment. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords,
it is subject to the requirements of due process of law. Arbi-
trary action is not due process.'
'0 °2
The Court's decisions in Roth and Sindermann have also been
misinterpreted as signaling the emergence of due process protection
for private employees.' 3 The proposition is preposterous, because
there is no state action when a private employee is fired, so that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are not applicable. 4
The employment rights of public school and college teachers ordi-
narily are geared to tenure statutes or regulations. Such enactments
generally provide for a period of about three to four years service
before the employee becomes tenured and thereby entitled to notice
and hearing with a decision on sufficient grounds before discharge.
The enactments usually further provide that even a non-tenured
employee cannot be dismissed during the annual contract period
without notice, hearing, and grounds.' 5 As it might be expected,
'2Concurring opinion in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1968).
"[Tihe state and federal governments, even in the exercise of their internal opera-
tions, do not constitutionally have the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private
employer." Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961). See
also Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159
(1968), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970); Van Alstyne,
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Use of
an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 751 (1969); Comment, Due Process and Public
Employment in Perspective, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1052, 1074 (1972).
"zNote, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
"'Hines v. Cenla Community Action Comm., 474 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1973).
'*'E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-217.4 et seq. (1968); Annots., 127 A.L.R. 1298 (1940),
113 A.L.R. 1495 (1938), 110 A.L.R. 791 (1937).
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educators are a highly mobile work force and traditionally have been
employed on annual nine or ten month contracts, with each year
being viewed as a separate job. By comparison, other governmental
employees enter into an employment relationship for a continuous,
indefinite term. Once they complete an initial probationary or train-
ing period, as a practical matter, they are viewed as permanent em-
ployees." 6 It is upon successful completion of the probationary or
training period that for Fourteenth Amendment purposes this latter
class of public employees should be regarded as having attained an
objective expectancy of continued employment, or having become the
beneficiaries of an implied contract of continued employment.'7 Un-
fortunately, the lower courts when called upon to enforce the holdings
of Sindermann and Roth have not given the public employees the
protection which they are due. A workmen's compensation referee
with more than fifteen years service,' °5 a teacher employed eight
years,' 9 and a teacher employed for twenty-two consecutive years,"10
were all held to be without procedural due process rights. Indeed, it
is a relief to find a Fourth Circuit decision rendered on due process
grounds favorably to a teacher of twenty-nine years service who was
dismissed!"' Under the typical civil service law an employee is on
probationary status and without job protection for a period of six
months."2 It would be a reasonable and easily administered standard
to hold that employees without statutory job protection similarly
should make the transition from temporary to secured employment
at the termination of a probationary or training period of six months
or so, after which they should be entitled to procedural due process
in advance of discharge.
For the statistics on job turnover rates, it can be estimated that
7.6% of the work force leave their jobs each month, including separa-
tions, quits, and layoffs. New jobs, including accessions and rehires
are obtained by 6.4% of the labor force." 3 It is obvious, therefore, that
the great bulk of the work force retains the same employment. All of
'01Of course, during the probationary period, the employee may be lawfully dis-
missed without a hearing and regardless of grounds (so long as the dismissal is not in
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right). Jenkins v. U.S. Post Office, 475
F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1973); Harnett v. Ulett, 466 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1972).
" See text at note 85 supra.
'Diles v. Woolsy, 468 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1972).
'"Patrone v. Board of Educ., 472 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1972).
"'Skidmore v. Shamrock Independent School Dist., 464 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1972).
"'Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972). Virginia's new teacher tenure
law required a three year probationary period after 1968.
"'E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.110(2) (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.250 (1969).
"'U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1972).
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those in this majority who are public employees should soon attain
the point at which they have earned the right to be protected from
discharge by procedural due process.
Summary and Empirical Analysis
We have seen how, through a series of legislative, judicial, and
socio-economic changes in a period of less than twenty years, the
American public employee who formerly had "no right to be a police-
man""' now may enjoy a combination of job security protections that
cumulatively are very extensive. The numerical effect of these protec-
tions is suggested by the table in the footnote below."' However, more
"'McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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important than the compilation of numerical advances is the ques-
tion of whether for the employer, the employee, and the public, these
developments have had a net beneficial or a net adverse effect.
The evidence shows that discharge from employment affects an
employee's self-esteem," ' since work plays a crucial role in the indi-
vidual's psychological identity and sense of order."7 There are also
indications that job satisfaction has a positive correlation with length
of employment."8 Therefore, the removal of threats to job security
should enhance job satisfaction. Job satisfaction, in turn, correlates
positively with low absenteeism, an accepted indicium of worker
productivity and efficiency."9 Thus, the available evidence points to
the conclusion that protection against arbitrary discharge is of signifi-
cant benefit to both the worker and the employer.
Furthermore, on a more legal and less psychological plane, it may
be argued that a decision to discharge reached by due process is more
likely to be a good decision than one reached arbitrarily. While there
may be no empirical evidence to support this argument, it probably
derives some validity from a fundamental assumption of our legal
system upon which it seems to be based, i.e., that a rational decision
is better than an irrational one.
Finally, it is submitted that due process protections against
arbitrary and summary discharge of public employees would tend to
improve the moral tone of society in general. Nowhere, it would seem,
is confidence in governmental processes more crucial than among
government employees. The attitudes which these employees hold
toward their employers are reflective of the fundamental fairness of
the systems under which they work and which govern the lives of all
citizens. Disrespect, dissatisfacton, and anxiety on the part of public
employees with respect to their employers would tend to be transmit-
ted to other citizens, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the
prestige and esteem of government in general. On the other hand, a
secure, satisfied public employee would tend to present an image of
the well-being and probity of government, an image likely to be ac-
cepted by other citizens.
It has been seen that many of today's workers have come to expect
"'M. AIKEN, L. FERMAN AND H. SHEPPARD, ECONOMIC FAILURE, ALIENATION AND
EXTREMISM 2 (1968).
"'REPORT OF SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO SECRETARY OF HEW, WORK IN AMERICA 4-6
(1972).
"'J. TIFFEN AND E. MCCORMICK, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 366-67 (5th ed. 1965).
"'Id. n.106.
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job security.' 0 Moreover, it has been shown that the often competing
interests of both public employer and public employee may be mu-
tually advanced by a requirement of due process in effecting dis-
charges; and that such a requirement also gains support from the
premise of rational decision-making within our legal system and from
a probable effect of bolstering societal morale. Thus, there appears
to be no reason why the expectation of job security should not be
realized by all public employees, especially since the public at large
also stands to gain.
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